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Abstract: 
The conflicts in the South China Sea have caught much attention in the past few years. The vast 
majority of academic studies focus almost exclusively on the Sino-Vietnamese and the Sino-Philip-
pine conflicts in the South China Sea and the Sino -Japanese conflict in the East China Sea. By not 
considering the structurally fairly similar conflict between China and Malaysia and generally focus-
ing on the past decade only those analyses neglect variation in Chinese conflict behaviour over time 
and between opponents. This article compares the high-profile Sino-Philippine conflict to the rather 
smooth relations between China and Malaysia. Whereas China has regularly challenged Philippine 
claims and activities in disputed regions, it has exhibited much more restraint towards Malaysia, even 
though the two countries’ claims overlap and Malaysia, unlike the Philippines, has been extracting 
substantial resources (LNG) from regions disputed with China since the 1980s. I argue that much of 
the observable between-country and over-time variation in Chinese conflict behaviour is rooted in 
the approaches chosen by China’s opponents for framing their overall bilateral relationships with 
China. Specifically, it is argued that China’s opponents in territorial and maritime conflicts can as-
suage Chinese behaviour on the ground by signaling recognition and respect of China’s overall self-
role and world-order conceptions. Conversely, if they challenge the overarching Chinese self-role 
and world-order conceptions, China tends towards a coercive strategy. China will also tolerate higher 
levels of assertiveness of its opponent in the contest for sovereignty, when the opponent displays 
respect for China’s recognition needs. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
China’s assertiveness towards its neighbors in the East and South China Sea has been a much debated 
topic in the international media and academic literature. After years of relative calm, disputes sharp-
ened during the past few years.  
The preliminary climax was reached in 2015 when China established of a number of artificial islands 
in the South China Sea that are currently being furnished with harbors and airports. These are most 
probably geared towards supporting Chinese military power and enabling the Chinese coast guard to 
better enforce Chinese laws in the disputed areas.  
Power transition theory would make us believe that Chinese conflict behavior in the South China 
Sea is to a significant extent an appendix of China’s effort to dislodge the United States as the hege-
monial provider of security for the East Asian region and establish a Chinese sphere of influence in 
its stead. Other analyses focus on China’s domestic politics, pointing either to the leadership change 
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from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping or a generally heightened nationalistic fervor that has to be taken into 
account by the national leadership in its choice of strategies for dealing with the conflicts in the South 
China Sea.  
While both lines of explanation have their merits, neither of them offers a sufficient explanation 
of Chinese shifts in assertiveness. First, they cannot explain earlier displays of Chinese assertiveness 
when Chinese capabilities were still fairly low and popular nationalism of no significant political 
importance. Further, as most studies merely focus on China’s high level conflicts with the Philippines 
and Vietnam and ignore the conflict with Malaysia that is managed rather smoothly, they tend to 
neglect variations in Chinese conflict behavior depending on opponent.  
Addressing these research gaps, this article analyses variation in Chinese conflict behavior over 
time and towards different opponents. It compares one crisis-prone dispute with the Philippines with 
the rather crisis-free dispute with Malaysia. Further, it adds historical depth by analyzing not only 
the current relationships but by giving equal attention to earlier phases of the conflicts.  
In both cases the disputes are about territorial sovereignty and sovereign rights. Both of China’s 
opponents have established outposts on selected islands and atolls. Both explore for sub-sea re-
sources, with Malaysia also extracting extensive resources in the disputed regions. Neither has com-
promised on any of its claims. Yet, whereas China has regularly challenged Philippine claims in the 
disputed regions, it has exhibited much more restraint towards Malaysia.  
I argue that much of the observable between-country and over-time variation in Chinese conflict 
behavior is rooted in the approaches chosen by China’s opponents for framing their overall bilateral 
relationships with China. Specifically, it is argued that China’s opponents in territorial and maritime 
conflicts can assuage Chinese behavior on the ground, when they signal recognition and respect of 
China’s overall self role conception and the core principles underlying Chinese foreign policy. Con-
versely, if they challenge the overarching Chinese self-role and world order concept, China will tend 
towards a coercive strategy.  
Such informal issue linkage is beneficial to Chinese leaders, because it allows the Chinese elite 
to portray China (and by extension themselves) as a highly respected international actor and thereby 
enhance their domestic legitimacy. Such recognition can offset the costs associated with lowering 
the levels of Chinese assertiveness in the dispute on maritime rights and sovereignty. Chinese com-
promises with respect to dispute behavior will not be forthcoming, if its counterpart is not willing to 
grant recognition to core aspects of the Chinese self role and world order conceptions.   
The empirical part of this study will focus on the two disputes pitting the Philippines and Malaysia 
against China. The main focus will be on the analysis of the signals of recognition, circumvention or 
challenge of Chinese self-role and world order conceptions sent out by the Malaysian and Philippine 
political leaders during the past four decades and correlate these to China’s behavior in the disputed 
regions. Recognition can be subdivided into direct and indirect recognition. In the former case, 
China’s opponent acknowledges the validity of Chinese conceptions through direct reference to those 
conceptions. Indirect recognition is understood as the proposition of alternative conceptions that 
carry similar meaning. Circumvention refers to a policy that ignores the Chinese normative preten-
sions. Government pronouncements and commentary refrain from relating to the Chinese self role 
and world order conceptions. Challengers actively advocate self-role and world-order conceptions 
that visibly conflict with Chinese understandings. 
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The following empirical parts of this study analyze, in how far China’s opponents willingness to 
reciprocate to the overarching Chinese self role and world order conceptions engenders positive re-
percussion with respect to Chinese conflict behavior in the disputes about maritime and territorial 
claims. It sets on with a description of Malaysian and Philippine attitudes towards China in the mid 
1970s, when China embarked on the physical assertion of its maritime and territorial claims by oc-
cupying Vietnamese held western part of the Paracel islands, without however, directly challenging 
the claims of two claimants focused on in this study. Subsequent sections focus on periods following 
the first occupation of elevations in the Spratlys by China in 1988 and the occupation of Mischief 
reef in 1995. It follows an analysis of the cooperative interlude in Sino-Philippine relations from 
2002 to 2008. The final empirical chapter focuses on Sino-Malaysian and Sino-Philippine relations 
during the past few years since approximately 2010.  
Before turning to the empirical analysis I will provide a short overview of the theoretical perspec-
tive employed, followed by a sketch of core tenets of China’s self role and world order conceptions. 
Here I only focus on those aspects that are unambiguously signaled to the international community 
by the political elite in official statements and will not deal with the much more complicated domestic 
Chinese discourse.  
 
2. Recognizing, circumventing or challenging an opponent’s self-role and 
world-order conceptions: Effects on Conflict Behavior 
The following analysis is broadly anchored in role-theory. Put simply it is argued that China’s be-
havior towards others varies with the degree of the other’s recognition of Chinese self-role and world 
order conceptions.  
The term self role conception is utilized in the sense of Holsti’s classical study of national role con-
ceptions, i.e. “ego’s own conception of his position and functions, and the behavior appropriate to 
them.”1 This understanding is similar to “role identity” as employed by Harnisch for “conceptions of 
[…] states about themselves as role players”. They “do not encompass the role proper because the 
role identity does not include the expectations and actions of others as such.”2   
Strictly speaking, world order conception cannot be conceived independently from self role concep-
tion, as the imagination of the ego-role creates the alter-roles together with the web of normative 
expectations and relationships that link the various actors. Insofar any self-role conception is consti-
tutive of a comprehensive world-order.3 Yet in practice it makes sense to differentiate between the 
 
1 Kalevi Holsti. ‘National Role Conceptions in Foreign Policy,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1970, p. 
239.. 
2 Sebastian Harnisch. ‘Role Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy,’ in Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick 
and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald, eds. China’s International Roles: Challenging or Supporting International Order? (New 
York/London: Routledge, 2015), p. 9. 
3 World order and world order conception belongs to those concepts that are widely utilized but hardly defined. I understand 
world order conceptions in the sense of “visions of world order, with their evolution over time coloured by the country’s 
distinctive moral, social and political legacies” (Pichamon Yeophatong, ‘Governing the World: China’s Evolving Con-
ceptions of Responsibility,’ Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6 No. 4, 2013, p. 332). World order con-
ceptions are normatively grounded and differ between countries and cultures as well as over time. World order con-
ceptions define “a desirable world order and the means by which it might be achieved” (Andrew Hurrell, “Foreword to 
the Fourth Edition,’ in Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,’ New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan: 2012, p.xvi). World order conceptions also entail a multitude of roles, differentiating between actors and 
defining their responsibilities and patterns of legitimate and appropriate behavior. Abstract role concepts like leader or 
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two on account of their foci, with the former centering on the self and radiating outward from there 
and the second providing a notion of the assumed and desirable characteristics of the overall system 
and the interrelationships between its constituent parts.  
While self-role conceptions may be espoused unilaterally the respective roles rest on recognition. 
Roles are “not owned by those who play them: they are part of the structure or ‘culture’ of the inter-
national system.”4 This means that new roles or role change is only possible, if the respective role 
concepts and the associated visions of world order are recognized and accepted as valid by others. 
Recognition in this context goes beyond “thin recognition” (i.e. the acknowledgment of the others’ 
juridical status as an independent, sovereign entity). I focus on “thick recognition” that refers to 
actors’ success in getting certain qualities of the imagined self and world-order conceptions acknowl-
edged.5 This in turn is the basis for the development of a we-group consciousness that binds the two 
parties though shared narratives, values, norms, professed aims and practices. Thick recognition 
closely resembles what Reinhard Wolf denotes as respect, a behavior that “confirms one’s self-as-
cribed value and importance” and in turn “promotes sympathy, trust, mutual identification, and open 
deliberation – all of which increase a cooperative attitude. Disrespect, on the other hand, challenges 
an actor’s self-respect or self-esteem […]. As such, disrespect tends to arouse anger and a self-pro-
tective urge to re-establish one’s ‘rightful position’.”6 Signals of respect have to focus on the respec-
tive state’s “subjective expectations and understandings, both of which are strongly affected by cul-
tural settings.”7 Given that order has “been differently conceptualized and pursued through a diverse 
range of institutional practices in different cultural and world historical contexts,”8 it should not come 
as a surprise that visions of a desirable order and corresponding practices of international relations 
are constantly contested. Until the mid 19th century China was the apex of a tributary system that 
may be conceptualized “as an international society with its own social structure […], […] which has 
a particular set of institutions that help to define norms of acceptable and legitimate state behavior.”9 
Small wonder, that the rising China of today is not content with taking the roles prescribed in the 
Western derived international system, but also aims at remaking its own role as well as the norms of 
the system itself. The success of this endeavor, however, depends on the willingness of other states 
to grant recognition to Chinese understandings. While denial of recognition (circumvention) already 
constitutes conflict, it becomes even more problematic, if it is coupled with explicit recognition of 
an alternative, competing framework that challenges the Chinese conceptions.  
 
big power are largely devoid of meaning if not filled with concrete normative and behavioral expectations derived from 
the specifics of the world order conception in which they are embedded.  
4 David M. McCourt. ‘The Roles States Play: A Meadian Interactionist Approach,’ Journal of International Relations and 
Development, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012, p. 374. 
5 Lisa Strömbom. ‘Thick recognition: Advancing Theory on Identity Change in Intractable Conflicts,’ European Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2014, pp. 168-191. 
6 Reinhard Wolf, ‘Respect and disrespect in international politics: the significance of status recognition,’ International 
Theory, Vol. 3 No. 1, 2011: pp. 106. For a differentiation of respect from the related concepts of esteem, prestige, status 
dignity and honor see pp. 114-116.  
7 Reinhard Wolf, ‘Respect and disrespect,’ p. 113.  
8 Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan. ‘The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice,’ The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2012, p. 3.  
9 Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan, ‘The Tributary System,’ p.  8. 
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Loosely following Shih and Yin10 I argue that China simultaneously pursues two partly contradictory 
goals: being respected or gaining recognition as a civilizational state and asserting itself as a territo-
rial state. Other states are able to manipulate China’s long-term interest in being recognized as a 
superior civilizational state or as normative power that provides highly valued conceptions of a de-
sirable world order. Let us assume that China’s opponents A and B will not compromise on territorial 
claims that clash with those of China. However, opponent A recognizes core aspects of China’s 
cherished self role and world order conceptions mirroring them prominently in public pronounce-
ments of its political leaders. Opponent A thereby creates a “we-group” based on shared values, 
norms and aims that is superimposed on the bilateral relationship, providing the overall framework, 
from which to evaluate the various dimensions.11 In the language of respect, state A signals respect 
for China’s overall self role and world-order conception,12 while not compromising on its deviating 
appraisal of the specific views on maritime rights and sovereignty. Opponent B denies such displays 
of respect (or recognition) and instead chooses to challenge the Chinese conceptions, advancing oth-
ers that deny the formers’ legitimacy and worthiness. Thereby he not only denies “we-ness,” but 
establishes a normative hierarchy between his (superior) and the Chinese (inferior) self. I argue that 
even though Chinese territorial interests with respect to opponents A and B are similar, and both 
opponents deny Chinese maritime and territorial claims, Chinese perceptions of the opponents will 
vary, and China will behave differently towards the two opponents on account of the variation in the 
others’ willingness to respect the normative framework established and highly valued by China.13  
The concrete argument underlying this study is straightforward and simple. China’s opponents can 
either recognize, circumvent or challenge China’s self-role and world-order conception. The level of 
recognition will influence China’s behavior in the maritime territorial conflicts:  
Hypothesis 1: The more a state grants recognition to China’s self-role and world-order concep-
tions, the more will China restrain its assertiveness in the maritime and territorial disputes.  
Hypothesis 2: Given similar acts of assertiveness of China’s opponents, China will react less as-
sertive towards the opponent that grants broader recognition to China’s self-role and world-order 
conceptions.  
 
10 Shih Chih-yu and Yin Jiwu. ‘Between Core National Interest and a Harmonious World: Reconciling Self-role Concep-
tions in Chinese Foreign Policy,’ Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2013, pp. 59-84. 
11 Such a “common ingroup identity” is able to reduce intergroup bias and conflict as it partly transforms the cognitive 
representation of the two groups from a juxtaposition of “us” and “them” to an inclusive “we” (Samuel L. Gaertner, et 
al., ‘The Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias,’ European Review 
of Social Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993: 1-26.  
12 Reinhard Wolf, ‘Respect and disrespect,’ p. 113. 
13 This is amongst other also supported by social psychological research. Clearly, “perceptions of self are intimately bound 
up with how we feel we are perceived by othrs. By extension, our perceptions of the other are also likely to be influenced 
by how we feel we are perceived by them” (Viv Burr, Giliberto Massimo, and Trevor Butt, “Construing the Cultural 
Other and The Self. A Personal Construct Analysis of English and Italian Perceptions of National Character,’ Interna-
tional Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 39, 2014, pp. 53-65). Research based on social identity theory suggests 
that small nations should be hesitant to mirror a big power’s self role and world order conceptions. Various studies 
showed that “people from smaller nations will denigrate larger nations because the smaller nations will have more 
difficulty in constructing and maintaining a high-status identity” (Viv Burr, Giliberto Massimo and Trevor Butt, ‘Con-
struing the Cultral Other and The Self’, p. 54). This research would suggest that denigration of large nations by small 
nations is at least partly a result of the small nations problem to establish “positive distinctiveness” (Jan Pieter Van 
Oudenhoven et all, ‘Asymmetric International Relations,’ European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 32, 2002,  pp. 
275-289). 
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3 China’s self role and world order conceptions  
 
3.1 Relational roles, Reciprocity and the Options of the Weak 
Following Shih and others, I argue that the self and other role as well as world order conceptions 
China wants to “make accepted” by the international community of nation states does not aim at the 
extension and eventual universalization of substantive norms (as for example human rights, democ-
racy, or capitalism). China “has no specific plan to change the world into the image of an ideal 
type.”14 Instead it aims at the dissemination of norms governing relationships; i.e. procedural norms, 
that “only” regulate interaction between the autonomous subjects of international relations. This de-
rives from China applying relationship logic to international relations: 
 “The logic of relationships is longitudinal. It assumes that while the future is unknown, the partners in the 
future are the same as in the past and present. Therefore the significance of any specific interaction lies in 
how it shapes a particular relationship. […] As China applies relationship logic to international relations, its 
actions aim to optimize relationships rather than transactions. In this model China does not use preponderance 
of power to optimize its side of each transaction, but rather to stabilise beneficial relations.”15  
The fundamental aim of such a relationship based order is for each subject to fulfill the “duties asso-
ciated with relational roles”16 and an effort “to achieve a reciprocal relationship.“17 This focus on 
upholding reciprocal bilateral relationships results in an orientation on long-term stability: “China 
and its targets compose a greater self, to the preservation of which their proper and stable relationship 
is essential.”18 Any interference in the other’s internal affairs is avoided. Instead each country is 
supposed to handle its own affairs. Relationship-based roles and reciprocal relations inhibit abstract 
and universal standards and encourage instead context-specific standards. Interaction is not so much 
defined by shared or contested substantive values and norms, but by shared procedural norms that 
stipulate a mutual disregard for the other state and society’s internal order.  
In asymmetric relationships as between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors, reciprocity and 
stability can be achieved by trading autonomy for deference, as deference by the smaller power sig-
nals acceptance of the overall asymmetric relationship.19 This in turn allows the stronger power to 
 
14 Huang Chiung-Chiu and Shih Chih-yu. The Identity and International Role of China: Relational Grand Strategy, in Se-
bastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald, eds. China’s International Roles: Challenging or Sup-
porting International Order? (New York/London: Routledge, 2015), p. 67. 
15 Brantly Womack. ‘China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor,’ in Nathalie Tocci, ed. Who Is a Normative Foreign 
Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 
296. 
16 Brantly Womack, ‘China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor,’ p. 267. 
17 Huang Chiung-Chiu and Shih Chih-yu, ‘Harmonious Intervention,’ p. 126. 
18 Huang Chiung-Chiu and Shih Chih-yu, ‘Harmonious Intervention,’ p. 13. 
19 Ringmar argues that at the core of the traditional China-centred tributary system was ritual, “through which the validity 
of their [the Chinese] worldview was internationally recognized.” The system, while being centripetal, entailed almost 
unlimited autonomy for the tributary states, as the “emperor did not claim sovereignty over the system as a whole and 
the constituent units were free to carry on their affairs as they pleased” (Erik Ringmar, Performing International Sys-
tems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian System,’ International Organization, Vol. 66, 2012, pp. 4-5). 
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grant autonomy to the weaker as it rests secure that the asymmetric relationship as such is respected. 
Deference then needs “not necessarily require submissive behavior. The minimum standard for def-
erence is that [the weaker state] B pursues its interests in a manner that is respectful of [the stronger 
state] A’s relative status.”20 Shih and his co-authors argue that China, preoccupied with upholding 
stable relationships and minimizing future uncertainty, will be willing to make compromises even 
with weaker opponents and to “sacrifice short-term interests for the sake of long-term interests.”21 In 
a game-theoretical modeling of the traditional East Asian tributary system Zhou Fangyin showed, 
that in the asymmetric dyadic relationships between China and the surrounding weaker states, the 
latter could maximize their gains by “paying tribute and maintaining the facade of a tributary sys-
tem,” while at the same time engaging in modestly assertive maximization of their immediate inter-
ests “in border areas.”22  
 
3.2 Continuity and Change in China’s self role and world order conceptions since the 
early 1970s 
When China turned towards the South China Sea for the first time by conquering the western part 
of the Paracel Islands in 1974 several crucial foreign policy watershed had already happened: the 
admission of China to the United Nations and the visits of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
and US President Richard Nixon in 1971 and 1972 respectively. Since its admission to the UN, China 
regularly presented its view of the world as it was and as it should be during the annual general 
assembly sessions.  
From the early 1970s onwards Chinese statements at the general assembly have one unmoving 
core that to China clearly is the foundation of just international relations: the five principles of peace-
ful coexistence established in the bilateral agreement with India in 1954: i.e in the words of the then 
Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua: “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual 
non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence.” This advocacy of absolute sovereignty and non-interference was accompanied 
by a strong stance against any form of hegemonism, be it in the form of “great-Power chauvinism” 
or “territorial expansionism.”23 In the context of its anti hegemonial and anti colonialist position, 
China supported the establishment of a “New International Economic Order.”  
 
Ritual signaled hierarchy, yet, the power of the centre was largely symbolical with the centre, tasked with upholding 
harmony, which was perceived as the natural state, whereas conflict was seen as an aberration. Peace therefore “was to 
be restored when misunderstandings were removed and virtue and manners improved” (Eric Ringmar, ‘Performing 
International Systems,’ p. 14). The focus on harmony signals a focus on the proper management of relations by fulfilling 
the reciprocal duties.   
20 Brantly Womack. ‘Asymmetry and Systemic Misperception: China, Vietnam and Cambodia During the 1970s,’ The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2003, p. 97. 
21 Huang Chiung-Chiu and Shih Chih-yu, Harmonious Intervention: China’s Quest for Relational Security (Farnham/Bur-
lington: Ashgate, 2014), p. 18. 
22 Zhou Fangyin. ‘Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System,’  The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 
No. 2, 2011, p. 156.  
23 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Official Records 2137th Plenary Meeting, 1973, A/PV.2137, p. 2-3.  
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In line with the positions advanced by the Non-Aligned Movement China supported the estab-
lishment of nuclear(-weapon) free zones and called for the two great-powers to withdraw “their 
armed forces, both conventional and nuclear back to their own countries.”24 Explicit Chinese support 
for the ASEAN initiated Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality for Southeast Asia (ZOPFAN) also 
aimed at neutralization and an insulation of the region against “interference by outside Powers.”25 
While China perceived alliances as hegemonial devices, it supported national self-strengthening of 
Third World Countries by building up “independent defense capabilities.”26  
When China turned to the Spratly Islands in the late 1980s, these core principles that had been 
included into the preamble of China’s 1982 constitution remained unchanged, even though references 
to colonialism and imperialism had lost their status as reference points for Chinese world-order con-
ceptions. China’s earlier confrontative stance towards the great-powers had given way to an appeal 
for the developed countries to show a more cooperative attitude towards the “Third World,” a per-
spective underscored by a new framework that analyzed international relations as moving towards  
“multipolarity,” which from the Chinese perspective was “conducive to peace.”27 Dialogue had be-
come the new framework for dealing with international conflict.28 Confronted with the newly emerg-
ing discourses on the universalization of core concepts of modern Western statehood, i.e. democracy, 
human rights and liberal market capitalism, China strongly insisted on the principle of non-interfer-
ence. The non-interference paradigm, however, was reframed as a positive “right of the people of 
any other country to choose their social system as they think fit.”29 To China, this right took prece-
dence over any effort to the protection of any of the above mentioned objectives. Any interference 
was sharply rebuked as a violation of the UN Charter.30 
China’s overarching interest in absolute sovereignty as the foundation of any desirable interna-
tional order became even more pronounced in the years following the Tiananmen incident, when 
China chafed under Western sanctions. Observance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
was deemed the sine qua non of two newly established guiding aims: international harmony and 
common prosperity. In the early 1990s “international harmony” had become a core theme of Chinese 
pronouncements on international relations. The desired development towards a multipolar order was 
supposed to rest on the attainment of international harmony, which “allows countries to make inde-
pendent choices and seek common ground while putting aside differences.”31 
Here we see the first expression of a link to traditional Confucian ideas on governance, that de-
fines harmony (和谐, hexie) as a form of cooperation between non-uniform countries (和而不同, he 
er bu tong),32 thereby again claiming the right of China to chose the own political, social and eco-
nomic system while at the same time guaranteeing others against any Chinese interference into their 
 
24 UNGA. Official Records 2051st Plenary Meeting, 1972, A/PV.2051, p. 18.  
25 UNGA. Official Records 2363rd Plenary Meeting, 1975, A/PV.2363, p. 214. 
26 UNGA. Official Records 2252nd Plenary Meeting, 1974, A/PV.2252, p. 378. 
27 UNGA. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Eighth Meeting, 1988, A/43/PV.8, p. 48. 
28 UNGA, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Eighth Meeting, 1986, A/41/PV.8, p. 54; UNGA. Provisional Verbatim 
Record, 1988, A/43/PV.8. p. 46. 
29 UNGA. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Forty Eighth Meeting, 1985, A/40/PV.48, p. 21. 
30 UNGA, Provisional Verbatim Record, 1986, A/41/PV.8; UNGA, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Eighth Meeting, 
1987, A/42/PV.8.  
31 UNGA. Official Records 39th Plenary Meeting, 1995, A/50/PV.39, p. 10.  
32  This goes back to Confucius , who said that the gentleman aims at harmony and not at uniformity (君字和而不同, 
junzi he er bu tong; Lunyu 13.23).   
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internal affairs. This turn towards selective anchoring of world-order conceptions in traditional Con-
fucian political philosophy also pervaded the continued Chinese opposition to “hegemonism” (霸权
主义; baquan zhuyi) Now, however, hegemony was criticized from a Confucian standpoint as a vi-
olation of the fundamental principle of justice not to do unto others what you would not like others 
to do unto you (己所不欲, 勿施于人, Ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren).33  
In the context of a rhetorical Confucianization of the Chinese world order conception the four 
principles of non-interference, anti-hegemony, multipolarity and harmony were further developed 
during the past two decades. In the mid 2000s, harmony was turned into the core principle of a de-
sirable world order: a harmonious world (和谐世界; hexie shijie), which in turn was based on the 
idea of a harmonious society (和谐社会; hexie shehui).  
Thereby China had established a model of the desired world order, which, in fundamental contrast 
to the Western conceptions (as conceived by the Chinese), does not aim at creating uniformity (sim-
ilar systems, based on universal values), but enable diversity with international norms focusing on 
the regulation of the relationships between the dissimilar. Security, being a result of harmony has to 
be “comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable.”34 As such, it arises from inclusion through “part-
nership rather than alliance.”35  
By emphasizing harmony and the Golden Rule, the Chinese leaders put up behavioral norms that, 
while derived from a local (Chinese) context, claim universal validity. Consequently “the Chinese 
Dream and the world’s dream go hand in hand.”36  
Put simply then, as Odgaard points out, the Chinese vision of world-order “can accommodate inter-
national relations characterized by co-management of global security issues between great powers 
that subscribe to different versions of international order.”37 Thereby it provides a less demanding 
vision for international peace than the liberal vision propagated by the US and the Western democ-
racies, which in the final analysis rests on a quasi-Kantian paradigm according to which international 
peace rests on the globalization of democratic governance. Whereas democratic peace requires the 
convergence of political orders, the Chinese vision is based on absolute sovereignty and non-inter-
vention only requires consensus on core norms governing the co-existence of states.  
 
4. 1974 China dispels South Vietnam from the Western Paracel-Islands 
Since the early 1950s the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam had shared the control of the 
Paracel-islands. Whereas the PRC controlled the eastern Amphitrite Group, the Republic of Vietnam 
had troops deployed on the western Crescent Group. In late 1973, the US reduced its military assis-
tance to the South Vietnamese regime and the South Vietnamese in turn reduced their troop presence 
on the Paracel Islands, only to discover in January 1974 that the PRC had moved part of its troops to 
the western Amphitrite Group. The armed clashes that followed ended after a few days with the 
 
33 UNGA. Official Records 8th Plenary Meeting, 1993, A/48/PV.8 CHINESE,  P. 21. 
34 Xi Jinping. Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared 
Future for Mankind, Statement at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly 28 September 
2015, UNGA, http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_ZH_en.pdf, p. 3.  
35 UNGA. Official Records 15th Plenary Session, 2014, A/69/PV.15, p. 38. 
36  Liu Xiaoming. ‘Speech at the Book Launch of Xi Jinping The Governance of China,’ London, 15 April 2015, 
http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/EmbassyNews/t1255009.htm.  
37 Liselotte Odgaard, ‘ Peaceful Coexistence Strategy and China’s Diplomatic Power,’ The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2013, , pp. 233-234.  
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defeat of the Vietnamese troops and the establishment of complete Chinese control over the whole 
Paracel Island group. While the 1974 military encounter did neither involve the Philippines nor Ma-
laysia, it was the first signal, that China would be willing to use force to assert its territorial claims 
in the South China Sea.  
 
4.1 Malaysia: Establishing a relationship based on harmony but not uniformity 
Given that the vast Chinese claims in the South China Sea encompassed almost the whole sea 
beyond a few miles along the coast of East Malaysia the Chinese move in the Paracel Islands should 
have been viewed with apprehension by the Malaysian political elite.38  
Yet, Malaysia chose to ignore the Chinese action in the Paracel islands. Less than three months 
after the armed clashes in the Paracel Islands, the Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak was 
the first of the ASEAN-states leaders to establish diplomatic relations with China.  
Malaysian leaders offered a vision on the region that was clearly appealing to the Chinese side. 
In 1971 already Razak had envisaged for China “the right to play a role in regional affairs commen-
surate with her importance and dignity as a major power and the right to expect that the countries of 
the region do not act in ways which adversely affect her.”39 Razak’s vision fit Chinese expectations 
also in so far as it opposed “security alliances with great powers which not only drag them [Southeast 
Asian nations] into external power conflict but more importantly sour the relations with each other 
to the detriment of the region as a whole.”40 Finally Razak argued that Southeast Asia should become 
a zone of peace and neutrality “guaranteed by all the great powers,”41 thereby positioning Malaysia 
at some distance to the US-centered and alliance-based concept of regional security.  
The credibility of this stance was underscored by Malaysia’s non-accession to SEATO, as well 
as by its initiative for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality for Southeast Asia and its active role 
in the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). Publicly, Malaysia opted for national self-sufficiency with 
respect to national defense, and a policy of insulating the region from superpower rivalry. Yet, Ma-
laysia tried to hedge its bets by cooperating with the United States, if in an unobtrusive way. In 1975 
Malaysian Foreign Minister Rithaudeen on a visit to the United States pointed out to the US Secretary 
 
38 For overviews of Malaysia’s China policies since the 1970s see for example: Stephen Leong, ‘Malaysia and the People’s 
Republic of China in the 1980s: Political Vigilance and Economic Pragmatism,’ Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 10, 1987, 
pp. 1109-1126; Joseph Chin Yong Liow, Malaysia-China Relations in the 1990s: The Maturing of a Partnership,’ Asian 
Survey, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2000: pp. 672-691; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, ‘Making Sense of Malaysia’s China Policy: Asym-
metry, Proximity and Elite’s Domestic Authority,’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics. Vol. 6, No. 4, 2013, 
pp. 429-467; Ngeow Chow Bing, ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partners but Prosaic Military Ties: the Development of 
Malaysia-China Defence Relations 1991-2015, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2015: pp. 269-304.  
39 Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussein, Ucapan-Ucapan Tun Haji Abdul Razak Bin Hussein 1971 (Speeches by Tun Haji Abdul 
Razak Bin Hussein 1971), (Kuala Lumpur. Pemangku Ketua Pengarah Percetakan Semenanjung Malaysia, 1976), p. 
129.  
40 Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein, Ucapan-Ucapan Tun Haji Abdul Razak Bin Hussein 1975 (Jilid II) (Speeches by Tun 
Haji Abdul Razak Bin Hussein 1975, Vol. II), (Kuala Lumpur: Pemangku Ketua Pengarah Percetakan Semenanjung 
Malaysia, 1981), p. 251. 
41. The Editor, Razak’s China Triumph: Malaysian Leader Reshapes Regions Political Landscape, The Asia Magazine, 
September 22, 1974, p. 28.  
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of State that “Some kind of discreet association is helpful to us. […] We are trying to be independent 
in our foreign policy, but there are things that we have to arrange discreetly.”42  
This frame of an independent foreign policy and the vision of a resilient region that tries to hold 
hegemons at bay was eagerly supported by the Chinese side, and reframed according to the current 
Chinese understanding.43   
Changing its past position, China explicitly repudiated the option of intervening in Malaysia’s 
internal affairs in defense of the interests of overseas Chinese. In the Joint Communiqué China de-
clared that it does  
 “not recognize dual nationality. Proceeding from this principle, the Chinese government considers anyone 
of Chinese origin who has taken up of his own will or acquired Malaysian nationality as automatically for-
feiting Chinese nationality.”44  
Initiated by Abdul Razak’s visit to China in 1974 the two countries managed to establish a practice 
of frequent high level visits that was to become an enduring practice to the present. The years fol-
lowing the establishment of diplomatic relations saw a number of top-level meetings, with the most 
prominent being Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Malaysia in 1978 and the reciprocal visit of Malaysian 
Prime Minister Hussein Onn to Beijing in 1979. In 1981 Chinese prime minister Zhao Ziyang visited 
Malaysia, followed by the Chinese foreign Minister Wu Xueqian in 1982.  
Despite the overall harmonious relationship, Malaysia did not hesitate to advance its territorial 
claims. In 1979 Malaysia made them public, when it published a first map that delineated the Ma-
laysia claimed EEZ. In 1983 it occupied the first island within the EEZ. One year later it promulgated 
its EEZ Act. While these acts elicited diplomatic protest from China, high-level diplomacy continued 
unabated, with the Chinese foreign minister visiting Malaysia in 1984 and Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir visiting China in 1985, where he was invited to give a prominent speech at Tsinghua Uni-
versity.  
Knowingly or unknowingly the Malaysian leaders in their pronouncements on Chinese-Malay-
sian relations followed the Confucian notion of “harmony but not uniformity” (he er bu tong), which 
aims at “interactions premised on respect for (not agreement with) those different from us.”45  
Mahathir Mohamad, who became Malaysian Prime Minister in 1981 was an especially convinc-
ing partner. He not only continued Malaysian advocacy of an independent foreign policy, the princi-
ples of non-intervention, peaceful coexistence, the rejection of collective security systems, and the 
establishment of a new international economic order and strengthened South-South cooperation. Ma-
hathir also established himself as a prominent critic of Western double standards, Western dominated 
international organizations and concepts with universal pretensions like human rights and democ-
racy. This position was developed in the 1990s into a normative alternative to Western world order 
conceptions based on supposedly “Asian values,” that closely fitted Chinese notions of a desirable 
international order. The credibility of this signaling was strengthened by the fit between the espoused 
 
42 US Department of State. Doc 300: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 30, 1974, in Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, https://his-
tory.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d300#fn1.  
43 The Editor, Razak’s China Triumph, p. 28. 
44 Joint Communique of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia, 31 May 1974, 
in FBIS-CHI-74-106, p. A29. 
45 Emilian Kavalski. ‘The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative Power Europe and Normative Power 
China in Context,’ Cooperation & Conflict, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2013, p. 254.  
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conceptions and Malaysian foreign policy activities in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Move-
ment or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (later renamed into Organization of Islamic Co-
operation) and its continued distance from military alliances and multilateral security institutions that 
included non-regional members.  
 
4.2 The Philippines: beguiling China, looking for US support and an international al-
liance 
Similar to Malaysia, the Philippines had no direct claim to the Paracel-Islands. However, whereas 
the Malaysian claim to territory and maritime rights in the South China sea was still “in the making” 
and not yet publicly stated, the Philippines had put up their claim to sovereignty over a large number 
and occupied several of the Spratly islands already in the early 1970s.46  
While the Philippines hardly reacted to Chinese actions in the Paracels, they protested, when 
South Vietnam occupied several of the Spratly Islands in the aftermath of their expulsion from the 
Paracels. Therefore the Philippine government asked the US to restrain South Vietnam, something 
the American embassy in Manila seems to have endorsed.47 
With respect to China, the Philippines followed the Malaysian lead by normalizing relations in 
1975.48 However, in fundamental difference to the Malaysian foreign policy decision, the Philippine 
change in policy lacked any overall vision of regional politics that could accommodate China. When 
Imelda Marcos, the Philippine President’s wife, visited China in 1974 she signaled consensus with 
respect to a number of issues that were at the core of the Chinese worldview. According to her, the 
Philippines and China “found common cause in furthering the interests of the Third World in the 
United Nations system” and also “share in the belief that respect for the sovereignty and the right to 
self-determination of peoples is the true cornerstone of harmonious international relations.” Imelda 
 
46 This drew an angry response by China that protested this as “a serious incident of flagrant violation of China’s territorial 
sovereignty committed by the Philippine authorities trailing after U.S. imperialism’s aggressive policy and war schemes 
in Asia. […] The open violation of China’s territorial sovereignty by the Philippine Government is absolutely not to be 
tolerated by the Chinese Government and people” (NCNA International Service, Philippines commits Flagrant Viola-
tion of PRC Territory, 17. July, 1971, in FBIS-FRB-71-138, p. A14). 
47 US Embassy Manila, Philippine Position with Respect to Spratley Islands, February 8, 1974, 1974MANILA01522_b; 
US Embassy Manila, Philippine Position with Respect to Spratley Islands, February 15 F, 1974, 1974MA-
NILA01767_b.  
48 For overviews of Sino-Philippine Relations see for example: Theresa C. Carino, ‘Philippine-China Relations in the Post-
Cold War Era, Asian Studies (Quezon City), Vol. 31-32, pp. 50-63. Luis T. Cruz, Philippine-China Bilateral Relations 
in the 1990s, Asian Studies (Quezon City), Vol. 31-32, pp. 79-85; Benito Lim, ‘The Political Economy of Philippines-
China Relations,’ Makati City, Philippine APEC Study Center Network, Discussion Paper no. 99-16, 1999; Carl Baker, 
‘China-Philippines Relations: Cautious Cooperation,’ Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Special Assessment 
2004, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdf; Aileen 
S.P. Baviera, ‘The Influence of Domestic Politics on Philippine Foreign Policy: The case of Philippines-China relations 
since 2004,’ Singapore, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Working paper No. 241, 2012; Renato Cruz De 
Castro, ‘The Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy against an Emergent China: Its Domestic and External Dimen-
sions,’ in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1, 2014: 5-27;  
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Marcos even praised Mao Zedong as “the beloved leader of China.”49 One year later, President Fer-
dinand Marcos even seemed to query the future of the Philippine-US alliance by arguing that “We 
must review our alliances.” Marcos even declared China to be a role model to be emulated: “I believe 
that China, with the depth of the moral outrage she has shown for the iniquities of the past and the 
present, is the natural leader of the Third World. […] As an Oriental, I cannot but be proud of your 
historic achievement.”50  
Yet, these Philippine signals rang hollow, as they were contradicted by actual Philippine policies. 
Besides Thailand, the Philippines was the only Southeast Asian state that had actively supported the 
US war effort in Vietnam by a troop presence. It was also a member of the US led South East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO). Further, it still was the most important regional US-ally. Finally, 
Philippine President Marcos had just proclaimed martial law in 1972, giving the armed conflict with 
the Communists insurgents as the core reason for this move. He explicitly accused the Philippine 
Communists of having “adopted Ho Chi Minh’s terrorist tactics” and “Mao’s concept of protracted 
people’s war.”51  
Against this backdrop the quasi-revolutionary appeal of the speeches by the President and his 
wife seemed highly implausible. It certainly did also not escape Beijing’s attention that the review 
the Philippine-US alliance was not meant to abolish them, but to get a better deal by renegotiating 
them. Further, the Philippine efforts to coax the US to extend their security guarantee towards the 
non-metropolitan territories clearly signaled that the Philippines would not subscribe to a policy of 
regional neutralization. As a consequence, once having achieved diplomatic normalization, China-
Philippines relations succumbed to a deep slumber. After the initial visit of President Marcos to 
China thirteen years would pass until Marcos successor, Corazon Aquino, would visit China in 1988. 
Simultaneously, Philippine-US relations thrived with US support proving crucial for the survival of 
the regime and the fight against internal insurgencies.  
 
4.3 1974 as a prelude to future relationships 
Neither of the two neighbors envisioned China’s first move as a direct threat to its security. To 
both, Vietnam was the by far more important potential adversary. Initially both seem to have been 
equally willing to grant recognition to China’s self-role and world-order conceptions. Malaysia’s 
rhetoric of recognition was a logical derivative of the own national world order conception. In con-
trast, Philippine flattery was highly implausible, given the simultaneous efforts to oblige the US even 
stronger to its defense. This difference in fit of self-role and world-order conceptions with Chinese 
expectations was signaled in the following years in the density of state-visits. Whereas Malaysia 
managed to establish a fairly strong relationship that included regular high-profile visits, the Sino-
Philippine relations were clearly lacking in such substance that may be utilized to signal mutual 
respect and interest in the case of good relations or used as venues for the confidential discussion of 
problems in strained times.  
 
49 Imelda Marcos, Imelda Marcos Banquet Speech in Beijing, September 23, 1974, in FBIS-CHI-74-186, p. A3. 
50 Ferdinand Marcos, Speech at 7 June Peking banquet, 7 June 1975, in FBIS-CHI-74-111, p. A14-A16.  
51 President of the Republic of the Philippines, Proclamation No. 1081: Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philip-
pines. 21 September 1972, http://www.gov.ph/1972/09/21/proclamation-no-1081/.  
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Malaysia from the 1970s onward provided plausible and active support for core dimensions of 
the Chinese self-role and world-order conceptions not only in its rhetoric towards China, but also in 
its actual conduct of foreign policy. This allowed China to perceive Malaysia as part of a we-group 
that not only centered on a shared vision of the desirable world-order. 
At the same time, Malaysia self-assuredly advanced its interests in the South China Sea and 
thereby clearly violated the local maritime and territorial interests of China. While the Philippines 
acted in a similar fashion in the South China Sea, it did not balance this by a credible commitment 
to any of the dimensions dear to the Chinese self-role or world-order conception. They joined 
SEATO, held their distance from the NAM and related to the United States in a clientelist fashion, 
actively demanding that their patron defend them in case of a conflict with China. According to the 
theoretical perspectives introduced above, Malaysia’s policy of recognition, its readiness to advance 
a highly compatible word-order conception and support core aims of Chinese overall foreign policy 
orientation should strengthen the Chinese willingness to reciprocate and “restrain its self-interests”52 
in the service of upholding the overall relationship. Contrariwise, the lack of credible Philippine 
support for Chinese self role and world order conceptions should result in a greater Chinese willing-
ness to press its immediate interests. 
 
5. China enters the Spratly Islands  
Given the fact that up to the mid 1980s China had no physical presence on the Spratly Islands while 
the other claimants had already occupied many islands and atolls there, it should come as no surprise 
that China tried to consolidate its long-standing claims by occupying various elevations in this region 
in 1987/88.  
In early 1987 China first protested against an alleged Vietnamese occupation of a further Spratly-
Island feature. Directly following the criticism of Vietnamese action, Chinese navy patrols went as 
far south as Malaysian-claimed James Shoal in an effort to signal Chinese resolve.53 Later that year, 
China sent a “scientific expedition” to the Spratlys.54 From August onward, Chinese forces explored 
and later occupied several reefs in areas claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines (Fiery Cross Reef, 
Cuarteron Reef). Vietnam reacted by occupying additional reefs on its part. Finally, in March 1988 
Vietnamese and Chinese forces clashed. In the following months both parties occupied further ele-
vations, but evaded direct contact.  
Given that all elevations occupied by Chinese forces lay within the Kalayaan Islands claimed by 
the Philippines one should expect the latter’s strong opposition. Likewise Malaysia should have at 
least felt seriously threatened not only because Cuarteron Reef is very close to its own claims, but 
also, because of the various “visits” of Chinese Navy vessels to James Shoal, which is only 30 nau-
tical miles (NM) from the Eastern Malaysian coast-line and in the south of the disputed maritime 
regions.  
 
52 Huang Chiung-Chiu and Shih Chih-yu, ‘Harmonious Intervention,’ p. 9. 
53 Ang Cheng Guan. ‘The South China Sea Dispute Re-Visited’, Singapore (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 
Working Paper No. 4, 1999), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP04.pdf, p. 6; Jianchuan zhishi 
(Naval and Merchant Ships), South China Sea Naval Exercise. Jianchuan zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) February 
8, 1988, trans. JPRS-CAR-88-034, p. 14. 
54 Greg Austin. ‘China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development,’ (St. Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. 82; John W. Garver. ‘China’s Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureau-
cratic and National Interests,‘ in The China Quarterly No. 132, 1992, pp. 999-1028. 
 
15 
 
China’s choice of elevations may provide a first tentative hint that the above established link can 
actually be observed in practice, as China exclusively choose atolls that lay within the Vietnamese 
and the Philippine claimed parts of the Spratlys. Yet, in the years preceding the Chinese move the 
most assertive acts had been undertaken by Malaysia that had officially promulgated its claims in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1984, passed the Fisheries Act in 1985 and established military 
installations on several features in 1983, 1986 and 1987 (Swallow Reef, Mariveles Reef, Ardasier 
Reef and Louisa Reef). Further, Malaysia had prospected offshore oil and gas within disputed regions 
of the South China Sea since the 1960s. Offshore-extraction had been ongoing in East-Malaysia’s 
Baram Delta, the central and the Greater Sarawak basin. While the first hardly overlaps, most of the 
latter lies squarely within the disputed regions. Compared to these extensive gas fields the Philippines 
had only explored one fairly small field (Reed Bank) within the perimeter of the Chinese claim off 
the coast of Palawan with meager results.55 Yet, even though China in 1988 occupied Cuarteron Reef 
less than 40 km from the boundary of the EEZ claimed by Malaysia, it did not transgress into Ma-
laysian claimed areas. Further, while it had protested the Philippine exploration at Reed-Bank in the 
1970s, there has never been any corresponding effort to signal China’s displeasure with Malaysia, 
even though the latter, in contrast to the Philippines, was already exploiting the subsea resources in 
contested areas off the coast of Sarawak.   
 
5.1 Malaysia: speaking softly and strengthening the “we-group” 
While Malaysia issued a formal statement that reiterated its claims in the South China Sea, it ab-
stained from commenting publicly on the Chinese moves. Malaysian reaction was devoid of political 
rhetoric that would have defined China as a possible threat. Likewise, the option of turning to the 
United States as a balancing power was ruled out. Instead, Malaysia chose to stick to its independent 
foreign policy line.  
While the lack of any public comment by the Malaysian elite may seem odd at first sight, it is 
only the continuation of a pattern exhibited in 1983 when a Chinese PLAN-squadron sailed to James 
Shoal. Whereas Vietnam protested against this violation of its sovereignty, Malaysia seems not to 
have reacted at all. A similar pattern can be observed in 1992 when the vice-governor of Hainan 
province, on board of a Chinese warship conducted an “inspection” of Malaysian claimed James 
Shoal, which, however, did not elicit any public Malaysian reaction.56 
With respect to the recognition of China’s self role and world order conceptions Malaysia stuck 
to its well-established foreign policy line of non-interference even after the Tiananmen incident of 
1989. In 1990, roughly half a year after the Tiananmen massacre Malaysia removed a long-standing 
ban on Malaysians who wanted to visit China. In the same year Kuala Lumpur received Chinese 
President Yang Shangkun and Premier Li Peng for state visits. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
 
55  Emil Attanasi and David H. Root, Statistics of Petroleum Exploration in the Caribbean, Latin America, Western Eu-
rope, the Middle East, Africa, Non-Communist Asia, and the Southwestern Pacific. U.S. Geological Survey Circular 
1096, 1993, http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1993/1096/report.pdf.   
56 John W. Garver, ‘China’s Push.’.  
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emphasized the Malaysian commitment to the principle of peaceful coexistence and non-interfer-
ence. To him China had “won the trust of friends and at the same time the right to handle its own 
internal affairs. Therefore, the ‘4 June’ incident [i.e. the Tiananmen massacre] has not affected Sino-
Malaysian relations.”57 While endorsing democratic government, Mahathir also made clear that de-
mocracy should be perceived as a means to an end, and not an end in itself, used by western powers 
to subjugate “those who do not comply with the latest interpretation of their democratic faith.”58 The 
“Asian values” advocated by him, demanded an Asian we-group of which China was to be a promi-
nent part. Mahathir explained that  
“[a]s Asians we intuitively understand what China is attempting to do. We intuitively understand why China 
is doing what it is attempting to do. We intuitively understand how China is going about the entire process 
of revolutionizing its society and building towards a place of pride and comprehensive prosperity for its 
people in the twenty-first century.”59 
Li Peng in turn lauded Malaysia not only on its successful economic development strategy, but 
especially on its “neutral, and non-aligned foreign policy”, its safeguarding of the principles of the 
NAM, the leadership in the ASEAN-effort to establish a zone of peace in Southeast Asia and its 
promotion of South-South cooperation and a New International Economic Order.60.  
Despite its willingness to recognize Chinese overall world order conceptions and signal respect 
for China’s effort to establish for itself a “place of pride”, Malaysia upheld its assertive policy with 
respect to its EEZ claims. Directly following the 1988 occupations Malaysian politicians announced 
a number of projects aimed at strengthening national defense. However, they were at pains not to 
connect the military build-up to the Spratly-problem.61 In late 1991 Malaysian Defense Minister 
Najib Razak announced that Malaysia would build an airstrip on one of the occupied atolls and install 
military equipment there. A few months later Malaysia and Vietnam agreed to jointly develop parts 
of the disputed area. Malaysia also significantly extended its capacity for offshore gas production 
and liquefied natural gas manufacturing and loading by extending its LNG Complex in Bintulu (Sa-
rawak) that had taken up production in 1983 (mostly shipping to Japan). The new complex went 
operative in 1995 (shipping to Japan, Taiwan and Korea). The gas was supplied from the Central 
Luzonia fields “located between 125 and 275 km offshore” Sarawak.62 In the early 1990s Malaysia 
also intensified further exploration in the Luzonia fields and reported the discovery of a number of 
new fields.63 
 
57 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Prime Minister Mahathir’s Speech at Banquet in Honor of Premier Li Peng,’ Renmin Ribao (Peo-
ple’s Daily) December 10, 1990, trans. FBIS-CHI-90-238, p. 17-18, quote p. 18.  
58 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Speech at the First Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the Summit Level Group for 
South-South Consultation and Cooperation,’ Kuala Lumpur, June 1, 1990, http://www.pmo.gov.my/uca-
pan/?m=p&p=mahathir&id=1129; see also Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Speech at the 9th Conference of the Heads of State or 
Government of the Non-Aligned Movement,’ Belgrade, September 4, 1989, http://www.pmo.gov.my/uca-
pan/?m=p&p=mahathir&id=993. 
59 Mahathir, Mohamad, ‘Speech at the 1994 China Summit Meeting,’ Beijing, May 11, 1994, http://www.pmo.gov.my/uca-
pan/?m=p&p=mahathir&id=1754.  
60 See: ‘Li Toast Notes “Stable” China,’ Xinhua Domestic Service, December 10, 1990, trans. FBIS-CHI-90-238, pp.18-
19.  
61 See various newspaper reports in Berita Harian, Utusan Malaysia, the New Straits Times trans. JPRS-SEA-88-028: 23, 
JPRS-SEA-88-029: 26–28 and JPRS-SEA-88-034: 34–35. 
62 Bintulu Development Authority. Projects. http://www.bda.gov.my/pages.php?mod=webpage&sub=page&id=59; see 
also Malaysia LNG Group of Companies.’ Our Facilities,’ http://www.mlng.com.my/#/.   
63  U.S. Geological Survey, World Petroleum Assessment 2000 – Description and Results, 2000  
(http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds-060/); Specific data on the Central Luconia region see U.S. Geological Survey, Central 
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None of these moves, however, elicited adverse Chinese reactions. The earlier established dense 
web of contacts continued unabated with the above mentioned visits of Chinese President Yang 
Shangkun and Premier Li Peng in 1990. In 1991 the Malaysian head of state Sultan Azlan Shah 
visited China, and in January 1992 Chinese President Yang Shankun paid his second visit to Malay-
sia. It was during these years, that the well established political relations were broadened to the mil-
itary sphere with the Malaysian Chief of Staff visiting China in 1991, reciprocated by the visit of the 
PLA’s Deputy Chief of Staff to Malaysia in April 1992. Shortly afterwards the then Defense Minister 
of Malaysia Najib Razak visited China with the Chinese defense minister in turn reciprocating in 
1993.64 1994 saw a visit of Jiang Zemin to Malaysia on account of the 20th anniversary of the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations. In Kuala Lumpur, he gave a programmatic speech that not only 
clearly outlined the Chinese self role and world order conception but accorded a prominent place to 
Malaysia.65  
 
5.2. The Philippines: a client not being able to make use of the patron 
To the Filipinos, the 1987/88 activities of the Chinese on the Spratly Islands came at a peculiar point 
in their modern history. They had just ousted their dictator Ferdinand Marcos and were experiencing 
a period of extreme internal instability. Further, the Philippine government grappled with a strong 
movement to declare the Philippines a nuclear-weapons-free-zone. Finally, the Philippines witnessed 
a political groundswell that eventually led to the abrogation of the Bases Agreement with the US, the 
Philippines’ mentor, guarantor of external security and most important economic partner in 1991.  
In this context, a small-scale skirmish in the Kalayaan islands was hardly a distraction from the 
overwhelming momentum of chaotic domestic politics. Given the public mood, turning to the US 
was clearly inappropriate. Lacking a tradition of self-reliance and a political will to develop a national 
capacity for external self-defense, options for the Philippines were limited.  
Even though the Chinese occupation of reefs and atolls had taken place within the Philippine 
Kalayaan claim, the Philippine government did not show any visible reaction. A government spokes-
person only remarked that the Spratlys could be mentioned during the planned visit of Philippine 
president Corazon Aquino to Beijing. He added, however, that “this is not going to be an issue.”66  
When Philippine President Aquino visited Beijing in March 1988, she exalted her hosts in any 
conceivable way. To her China was “the premier Asian state” and Beijing “the center of the Chinese 
universe, from where the Lord of Ten Thousand Years maintained the equilibrium, prosperity and 
harmony of the realm.”67 With respect to the Spratly problem she pointed out that “with regard to 
 
Luconia, Assessment Unit 37020101, http://certmapper.cr.usgs.gov/data/PubArchives/WEcont/re-
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65 For the text of the Jiang Zemin’s speech see FBIS-CHI-94-222, p. 3-6. 
66 ‘Chinese, Viets clash over Spratly,’ Manila Standard, 6 March, 1988, pp 1 and 6, quote: p. 6 
67 Corazon Aquino. ‘A Truly Independent China,’ Beijing April 15, 1988, http://www.gov.ph/1988/04/15/banquet-speech-
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possible conflicting claims […] respect and lawful regard have been consistently maintained.”68 In 
return Aquino got a Chinese commitment that “the Filipino troops garrisoning on several islands in 
the group will not be attacked,”69 and probably more importantly also an agreement according to 
which “the question of the Nansha Qundao [Spratly Islands] may as well be temporarily shelved.”70 
Whereas in its immediate reactions to the Chinese advance the Philippines stuck to its positive 
perception of China, this clearly changed in the following years. While the Philippines under Presi-
dent Aquino trod carefully with respect to the Tiananmen massacre and did not join the Western 
chorus of damnation, they avoided taking any position. This strategy of circumvention became much 
more pronounced after Ferdinand Ramos became President of the Philippines in 1992. During his 
visit to China in 1993 he lauded the Chinese for their economic success, but took pains not to com-
ment on the political situation.  
Yet, Ramos’ non-committed stand was sufficient for the two countries to sign a general agreement 
for a joint exploration. Further, China offered to assist the Philippines in the modernization of their 
armed forces. Both initiatives, however, were not followed up on. Instead only a few days after his 
return from China Ramos unilaterally authorized a marine survey of the Spratly Islands. A foreign 
affairs official conceded publicly that the timing had been deliberate, as the Philippines “didn’t want 
to risk ruffling any feathers before the state visit.”71 Less than one year afterwards, the Philippines 
proposed to internationalize the conflict by invoking ASEAN and the UN, thereby directly challeng-
ing the long-standing Chinese preference for a bilateral management.72  
Further, while avoiding any direct reference to Chinese self role and world order conceptions, the 
Ramos administration indirectly challenged both, by actively supporting the alternative world-order 
conceptions as propagated by the United States, Japan and the Western camp in general. President 
Ramos repeatedly anchored the Philippines in the democratic camp and supported the United States 
as “the undisputed leader of the Free World.”73 To Ramos “the time for authoritarianism has passed 
– in our country and in the world.”74 The constructed we-group to which the Philippines subscribed 
relied on the “common commitment to democracy and the rule of law.”75 Regional security, in Ra-
mos view, “certainly requires U.S. leadership” in a future security structure that, while established 
“under the auspices of the United Nations,” nevertheless should be “led by the United States.”76 The 
 
68 Corazon Aquino. ‘Mutual Respect for Sovereignty,’ Beijing, April 15, 1988, http://www.gov.ph/1988/04/15/speech-of-
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71 Quoted in: Jose G. Ebro. ‘Ramos Orders Survey of Spratlys’ Marine Resources,’ Business World, May 4, 1993, reprinted 
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Philippines and the United States were united by “the values that both Americans and Filipinos cher-
ish deeply: the sanctity of human rights, the value of democracy and the efficacy of the free market.” 
Further Ramos not only opined that the “Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 […] must 
be strengthened despite the changes in the global and regional security situation.” He also explicitly 
welcomed “America’s determination to oppose any resort to the use of force in the Kalayaan or 
Spratly area.”77  
 
5.3 Comparing reactions 
Despite the distinct southward thrust of the 1987/88 Chinese operations, the immediate reactions of 
the Malaysian government continued along its established policy line of publicly ignoring the Chi-
nese activities while supporting Chinese world order conceptions and the benign Chinese self image.  
The Philippines hardly reacted at all due to domestic constraints. President Aquino’s strategy of 
praising China and not publicly criticizing its conduct in the Spratlys during her visit to Beijing was 
successful in so far as it brought about some crucial Chinese commitments that took the form of 
unilateral concessions.  
The differences below the superficial similarity in Malaysian and Philippine rhetoric became ob-
vious after the Tiananmen massacre, the unraveling of the Eastern Bloc and the re-evaluation of the 
Vietnamese threat after Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia. 
The Malaysian government not only continued along its well-established independent foreign 
policy line but also stuck to its policy of non-interference, as it denied taking part in the moral outrage 
over the violence carried out in the course of crushing the Tiananmen demonstrations. Thereby Prime 
Minister Mahathir provided crucial support when Chinese leaders were on the defense in the global 
arena. 
In contrast, as in the 1970s, the initial recognition advanced by the Philippines soon came to 
naught, when the Philippines chose to explicitly support the dominant world order conception ad-
vanced by the United States, a conception that not only championed democracy over autocracy, but 
also legitimized and (arguably) even demanded its global promotion. Further, by explicitly linking 
its own national security in the Spratlys to the continued US-hegemony the Philippines openly re-
jected any Chinese pretensions for an inclusive security concept for a multipolar region and the world 
at large.  
 
6. China occupies Mischief Reef  
In early 1995 the Philippine government made public that Chinese forces had occupied Mischief 
Reef, an elevation in the eastern part of the Spratlys that has been claimed by Vietnam, the Philip-
pines, the PRC and Taiwan, but not Malaysia.  
 
77 The American Presidency Project. The President’s News Conference With President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines, 
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Similar to 1988, the rationale of China’s choice is unknown. Occupying a feature more to the South 
of the Spratlys would have sent a much stronger message with respect to Chinese sovereignty claims 
than the occupation of Mischief Reef. Within the Malaysian claimed EEZ, a number of features were 
still unoccupied at the time, most prominently Erica Reef and Investigator Shoal.  
As in 1988, the Chinese choice cannot be explained by differences in the opponents’ assertiveness 
on the ground. From the Chinese point all opponents plundered the subsea oil resources that rightfully 
belonged to China.78 Yet, while the Philippines had been fairly inactive in this respect, Malaysia had 
expanded its installations in the Greater Sarawak Basin and decided to jointly explore and exploit 
the subsea resources with Vietnam. Actually Malaysia was the country that most aggressively ex-
plored for oil and gas in the regions disputed with China.79. Further, at the time it was already known 
that the Spratlys were comparatively poor in hydrocarbon-resources when compared to the Greater 
Sarawak and the Saigon Basin in the southernmost part of the Chinese claim. If China wanted to 
signal its opponents’ to the continuing exploitation, clearly the Philippines were the wrong choice.  
While the Philippines had not been more assertive than Malaysia, during the years preceding the 
Chinese move, the two states continued to differ significantly with respect to their positioning with 
respect to the Chinese self role and world order conceptions. While the Philippines adjusted its posi-
tion towards an indirect challenge by positioning itself into the “Western” camp of liberal democra-
cies and acknowledging the global mission to advance democracy, Malaysia continued to embed the 
conflict into an overarching framework of recognition and respect and an imagined we-group that 
drew heavily on core concepts advanced by the Chinese.  
It seems plausible to assume that China probably did not want to estrange the only other claimant 
who had consistently shown that he was willing to accept and support the overall Chinese self-role 
and world order conception.  
 
6.1 The Philippines: turning to its patron and the international public 
In contrast to 1988 the Philippines imagined the 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef as a threat to 
Philippine security. In reaction, the Philippines opted for a strategy of internationalization that sought 
to establish a moral duty of the “free world” to support the Philippines. The new security-discourse 
focused on the own helplessness in the face of a superior rogue power. In the words of National 
Security Advisor Jose Almonte “we are David in front of a Goliath. Only this David doesn’t even 
have a slingshot.”80  
The Philippine elite reframed the conflict into one that should be “a multilateral concern of all 
claimants and parties interested in the stability of the South China Sea and the East Asia region as a 
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whole.”81 Top administration officials, put significant pressure on the United States by insinuating 
that the latter’s reaction to the Chinese actions would make visible, “whether the US has fully aban-
doned Southeast Asia after Washington dismantled its US military facilities in the Philippines.”82  
Philippine political class also turned towards openly challenging the Chinese self role and world 
order conceptions, as they defined the conflict as one between good and evil. Chinese action was 
portrayed as a demonstration of might against right with the conflict over sovereignty being trans-
formed into one between the forces of democracy and its opponents83 The moral inferiority of China 
on account of its autocratic domestic political system was repeatedly used as a reference for differ-
entiating between the morally upright self and the degenerate other. Senator Blas Ople threatened 
that China’s activities “may invite diplomatic quarantine reminiscent of world reaction to the mas-
sacre of students and workers at Tiananmen Square some years ago.”84 Others argued that the occu-
pation of Mischief Reef could be a first step towards the “’Tibetization’ of the South China Sea.”85 
Philippine national security adviser Jose Almonte criticized China by expressing his hope that in the 
future “Beijing will come down in favor of more freedom for the Chinese people and of progressing 
together with its neighbors.”86  
The Philippine establishment did not only turn to the US audience, amongst other by lobbying a 
number of congressmen, but also tried to catch the attention of the international public for example 
by inviting a large number of journalists for cruises to the Spratly islands, despite Chinese protests.  
By mid 1995 the crisis slowly subsided with the onset of the Taiwan crisis87 that led both parties 
to lose interest in continuing the dispute. The Philippines had, albeit slowly, succeeded in pressuring 
the US into a stronger commitment to regional security and China was confronted with a much bigger 
problem.  
Shortly after, the two countries signed a bilateral code of conduct that, for the time being, put to 
rest the conflict over Mischief Reef and focused on both countries commitment to peaceful conflict 
behavior and confidence-building.  The Philippines explicitly accepted that disputes “shall be settled 
by the countries directly concerned.”88 
In November 1995, Chinese President Jiang and Philippine President Ramos met on the sidelines 
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Osaka and reportedly discussed joint 
development of marine resources in the disputed regions. Despite this turn-around, the Philippines 
stuck to their focus on a community of shared values focused on the United States, their support for 
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continued US-hegemony and their normative distance to China and its rulers. In the words of Ferdi-
nand Ramos:  
“I ask you not to underestimate the power of America's democratic ideals to help shape East Asian political 
systems. […]America’s military hegemony in the post-cold war period gives it the historic opportunity to 
bring political morality to international relationships – to shape a moral world order. […] Authoritarian re-
gimes may seek their legitimacy by sponsoring capitalist growth. But economic development cannot – forever 
– substitute for democracy. And it is to the idea of America that East Asia looks – in its groping for free-
dom.”89  
A more abrasive refusal of Chinese self role and world order conceptions is difficult to imagine 
in the world of international relations.  
6.2 Malaysia: still speaking softly and upholding the “we-group” with China 
Malaysia stuck to the line it had already adopted in the 1970s and further developed in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Neither the Chinese occupation nor the Philippine reaction received any major reporting 
or executive comment. Yet, Prime Minister Mahathir visited Malaysian occupied Swallow Reef to 
signal Malaysian resolve with respect to its territorial and maritime claims.  
Barring such symbolic activities, Prime Minister Mahathir largely avoided the issue and instead reg-
ularly focused on the claimed joint preference of Asians for an Asian-style democracy. Continuing 
along the line espoused in Beijing a decade earlier, he argued that “democracy is a method of gov-
ernment. It is good only if the results are good.” Consequently, to Mahathir, “[e]ach country should 
be allowed to tailor its democracy to cater to the characteristics of its people and its needs.”90 
With respect to regional security, Mahathir also stuck to the traditional Malaysian position of keeping 
the region clear from superpower competition with the accompanying threat of an extended arms 
race. Mahathir consistently repeated the normative cornerstones of the “we-group” that united Ma-
laysia and China from the aim of achieving a multipolar and equitable world order to non-interfer-
ence. These were also expressed prominently in official bilateral documents as the China-Malaysia 
Memorandum of Understanding of 1999.91  
Any critique of China was balanced by criticism of the United States. Foreign Minister Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi argued that China “must be able to temper the arrogance and assertive belligerence 
that can sometimes typify the demeanor of those who have just scaled new heights of power.” How-
ever he connected this with a critique of the US by calling for a regional order “which constrains the 
powerful from using illegitimate and unfair means to prevent others from pursuing legitimate aspi-
rations and realizing their full potential.” Without mentioning names, he extended this criticism to 
the Philippines as one of those “who are wedded to the preferred imbalance of power” with the US 
as the supreme hegemon.92 Consequently, Prime Minister Mahathir argued that China and Malaysia 
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shared an interest in “discouraging the formation of alliances in the region.”93 Taking up the long-
standing Chinese position, Malaysian leaders endorsed actual settlement exclusively “through bilat-
eral friendly consultations and negotiations.”94  
Again, this active recognition and support for Chinese self role and world order conceptions al-
lowed Malaysia not only to continue its force modernization program and expand its hydrocarbon 
production in offshore areas disputed with China, but even to occupy two more reefs in 1999 without 
encountering any more than token Chinese protest.  
 
6.3 Comparing reactions 
The reactions to the 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef could hardly have been more different.  
The Philippines strengthened their strategy developed in the early 1990s that increasingly focused 
on denying not only the Chinese pretensions to a benign self-role but also Chinese visions of a more 
just regional order. The challenge to Chinese self role and world order conceptions was clad in an 
exaltation of the values that bind the Philippines to the United States and an imagined community of 
democratic countries. This was contrasted with a publicly presented image of China as a normatively 
inferior rogue state whose actions contravened universal standards of international law and, even 
more importantly, international morality. At the same time, the Philippines did neither invest in na-
tional security nor an enhancement of their maritime domain awareness. Actual assertiveness on the 
ground remained fairly low. Instead, it chose to continue its dependence on the US-security umbrella. 
Utilizing the China threat, the conservative establishment managed to turn around the formerly anti-
American mood, so that in 1998 a new Visiting Forces Agreement could be signed which was ratified 
in 1999.95  
Malaysia in contrast continued its earlier policy of simultaneously supporting core dimensions of 
China’s self role and world order conceptions on the one hand while at the same time resorting to 
clearly assertive displays of its own territorial and maritime claims. Significantly, while Malaysia 
regularly voiced support for the Chinese preference for bilateral conflict management, Malaysia at 
no point in time reneged from its practice of unilateral hydrocarbon exploitation, to which China, 
however, seems to have succumbed.  
 
7. A cooperative interlude in the Philippine-Chinese relationship 
A temporary change in Philippine policy towards China in the early 2000s allows us to assess how 
China might have acted and reacted if the Philippines had constantly been more responsive to the 
Chinese need for recognition of its benign self role and world order conceptions.  
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After 9/11 the new Philippine government under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo turned towards 
a strategy that aimed at getting more leverage in foreign policy and maximize Philippine options by 
balancing the two contending great powers, China and the United States. On the one hand the Phil-
ippines under Arroyo posed as one of the most ardent supporters of the US war against terror and 
thereby were able to maximize U.S. support for counterinsurgency against domestic Muslim and 
Communist rebels. At the same time the Arroyo government mended fences with China not only by 
toning down rhetoric, but also by having the national oil corporation, the Philippine National Oil 
Corporation sign a bilateral agreement on joint exploration in the South China Sea with its Chinese 
counterpart in 2004 to which Vietnam acceded in 2005. Thereby the Philippines not only took up the 
long-standing Chinese offer to jointly develop the resources while shelving the question of sover-
eignty, it also signaled accord with the Chinese preference for dealing with the subject on a bilateral 
basis. The later accession of Vietnam illustrated that such bilateralism need not be exclusive but can 
provide a first step towards more inclusive forms that bring together all concerned parties. This suc-
cess was complemented by enhanced confidence-building measures between China and the Philip-
pines. Further, Chinese companies successfully bid for several crucial infrastructure projects in the 
Philippines, with China providing large loans for their realization. Sino-Philippine bilateral trade 
sky-rocketed with the Philippines for the first time enjoying an enduring trade surplus.  
The enhanced bilateral relationship was mirrored in mutual visits by politicians and military leaders 
of the two countries. Arroyo visited China in 2001 (two visits), 2004, 2006, 2007 (three visits), 2008 
(two visits), and in 2010 (Government of the Philippines no year). China responded with visits of 
highest-ranking leaders to the Philippines, amongst them former Pemier Li Peng and President Hu 
Jintao in 2002 and 2005 respectively. In 2007, the Chinese People’s Daily, on account of a visit of 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to the Philippines, opined that “Sino-Philippine Relations Enter a 
Golden Period.”96  
However, this “Golden Period” came to an abrupt halt in 2008, when the Philippine president’s 
China deals came under a barrage of criticism in the Philippine media and politics. Even though the 
initial bi- and latter tripartite agreement for joint maritime research had been concluded between the 
national oil corporations and contained an explicit clause according to which “the Parties recognize 
that the signing of this Agreement shall not undermine the basic position held by the Government of 
each Party on the South China Sea issue,”97 the government was faced by broad-based attacks from 
members of Congress and Senate, as well as from the vast majority of media for selling out Philippine 
sovereignty to China and agreeing to the contracts in exchange for huge sums of corruption money.98 
China, trying to preserve the positive dynamic, even made its Manila Embassy release a statement 
that the tripartite cooperation in exploration “complies with the principles of the ASEAN-China Dec-
laration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and is conducive to maintenance of 
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peace and stability in the South China Sea and the region at large,” and that joint development “serves 
the common interests of all sides concerned.”99  
Fighting for its political survival, the Arroyo-government did not extend the Joint Maritime Seis-
mic Undertaking after its initial phase expired in 2008. The other projects were aborted as well. The 
effort to balance the United States, China (and to a lesser extent Japan) “against each other to ensure 
national security”100 had come to an end. The Philippines were back at what De Castro unflatteringly 
calls a “protectorate status”101 to the United States. China was put under general suspicion, as having 
concluded all those deals only because it wanted to “be able to explore the Spratly Islands’ natural 
gas and oil deposits.”102 In 2008 Hermogenes Esperon, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed 
Forces, visited the disputed Spratly Islands. The Philippines announced that they would improve the 
runway on Philippine occupied Thitu Island in the Spratlys. Underscoring the return to the earlier 
framework Esperon first admitted that “We don't have enough firepower to last a single day in bat-
tle,” in order to add that “this won't happen now because the United Nations will not allow it.”103  
In 2009 President Arroyo signed into law the Philippine Baseline Bill (Republic Act No. 9522) 
that established the baselines from which to measure Philippine maritime claims and explicitly in-
cluded the Kalayaan Islands and Scarborough Shoal, a move that drew angry protest from China and 
even led to the cancelation of official visits.104 When China announced that it had dispatched a patrol 
ship to the South China Sea, Philippine National Security Advisor Norberto Gonzales opined that 
such a move “should remind us that even in this era of dialogue and understanding in the world, there 
will always be nations that will show might and threaten perceived weak nations like us.”105 Thereby 
Philippine politics had reintroduced the standard rhetorical device of David who, being threatened 
by the rogue Goliath, appealed to the international community in his quest for justice and the rule of 
law. While the Philippines had not turned to positive recognition of China’s benign self role and 
world order conceptions during the preceding years, the Arroyo government successfully circum-
vented the issue. By 2009 they had returned to their earlier position of challenging the dragon’s 
benign self image.  
 
8. China’s “new assertiveness” in the South China Sea  
Whereas earlier Chinese assertiveness hardly ever targeted Malaysia, this no longer holds true 
since Chinese government ships regularly ply the seas claimed by Malaysia. This first became public 
when the Chinese Armed Forces informed the public that a Chinese Navy flotilla had conducted 
patrol and high-sea training exercises near James Shoal less than 80 km off the East Malaysian coast 
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in 2013. Shortly afterwards another Chinese government ship seems to have thrown sovereignty 
markers into the sea near the disputed Reef. In early 2014 Chinese warships appeared at James Shoal. 
In June 2015 Malaysia announced that it had detected a Chinese coast guard vessel at Luconia Shoal 
most probably had been anchored there for two years. This vessel only left the area in November 
2015.  
Chinese-Philippine relations had already soured with the enactment of the Philippine Baseline 
Bill in 2009 (Republic Act No 9522). Escalation on the ground commenced in 2011, when a Philip-
pine navy vessel rammed a Chinese fishing boat. In the same year the Philippines decided to unilat-
erally commence oil exploration in the Northeast of the Spratly Islands around Reed Bank. Unsur-
prisingly the Philippine decision evoked protests from the PRC. Despite the protests the Philippines 
went along with the exploration. In early March, the exploration ship was forced to leave the area by 
two Chinese Marine Surveillance Force vessels.  
In early 2012, the Philippines issued new invitations for investments in oil and gas fields in the 
South China Sea. Shortly afterwards, Chinese Maritime Security vessels confronted a Philippine 
Navy vessel that had tried to apprehend Chinese fishermen in Scarborough Shoal area. The situation 
escalated as the two contending forces opposed each other for several weeks. Even though both sides 
initially withdrew their vessels from the area, the Chinese returned and since then block the entrance 
to the shoal to Philippine fishermen.  
In 2014, Chinese ships also temporarily blocked the resupply of a Philippine ship that has been 
run aground at Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 after the Philippines announced that the ship had been 
run aground deliberately “to serve as a permanent Philippine Government installation” in contraven-
tion to earlier statements that the grounding was an accident and the ship would be removed. 106 The 
Philippines in turn unilaterally initiated an arbitration case against China at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in early 2013. Although China does not participate in the case, the initial steps for arbi-
tration have been completed, the arbitration court ruled that it has jurisdiction in October and com-
menced with the hearings in November 2015.  
The year 2015 saw a further escalation, after it became publicly known that China has been cre-
ating artificial islands out of its outposts in the Spratlys. These islands are meant to harbor airports, 
ports, lighthouses and will most likely be equipped with military equipment. The first lighthouses 
started operation in October 2015 and the first airplane landed on Fiery Cross Reef in early 2016.  
 
8.1 The Philippines: challenging China and going international 
In 2010 the new Philippine President Benigno Aquino assumed office on the basis of a highly re-
formist agenda. He presented himself as a leader who took up the burden to end “the silent suffering 
of the nation.” He promised establish the Philippines “as a reliable member of the community of 
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leases/2333-dfa-statement-on-china-s-allegation-that-philippines-agreed-to-pull-out-of-the-ayungin-shoal.  
 
27 
 
nations.”107 and put up the Filipino as a role model for the world. With the Filipinos ready to defend 
the Philippines: “It is not impossible for the Filipino […] to stand with his head held high and bask 
in the admiration of the world.”108  
In line with this new agenda, the new administration replaced the short-lived former president’s pol-
icy of equi-balancing China and the United States with a policy of external balancing of China 
through the traditional guardian of Philippine external security, the United States.109   
Under Aquino Manila returned to its internationalization strategy turning to the US, ASEAN and 
the United Nations for support.110 The Philippines supported its campaign by a moral crusade that 
again juxtaposed right and might.111 The Philippines consistently portrayed themselves as standard 
bearer of fundamental universal principles underlying a just international order. Philippine opposi-
tion to China was interpreted as “an unwavering adherence to international law. Since international 
law must be observed, it behooves the Philippines to embrace this imperative to the fullest.”112 The 
small Philippines were presented as fighting for a common good and in need of international support. 
Foreign Minister Del Rosario for example stated towards his ASEAN colleagues  
that the Philippines has borne more than its share of the heavy burden for ASEAN and the international 
community on this issue. […] Even as this issue is unfolding in our region, it invariably affects the entire 
global community. […] On this most important issue, is it not time for ASEAN to finally stand up for what 
is right?”113  
In a further challenge to China’s benign self role conception, the Philippine President repeatedly 
alleged that the current situation in the South China Sea resembled the situation in 1938 when the 
Western Great Powers allowed Nazi Germany to swallow the Sudetenland.114 During his 2015 visit 
to Japan, he indirectly compared Japan, painted in the brightest colors, with an anonymous threaten-
ing other. Japan and the Philippines were described as 
 “the most vocal defenders of that stability, which has recently come under threat. […] I see my people’s 
peaceful character reflected in the Japanese: We are both constantly willing to dialogue, bending over back-
wards to deescalate tensions despite repeatedly getting rebuffed, and still trying to resolve disagreements 
through peaceful means and internationally recognized norms. Perhaps I may share with you a question that 
I posed to a country that we both have had difficulties with: If all governments are there to serve the people 
from whom they derive their power, is it not incumbent upon all to maintain stability, which is a necessary 
prerequisite for prosperity? How does fomenting tension help us achieve the primary goal of bettering the 
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lives of our people? […] Ours is a partnership that can only grow stronger, because it is based not on mere 
practicality, but on shared values and mutual respect among equals.”115  
The filing of a case against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in early 2013 was a 
further move to differentiate rogue China from the civilized and law-abiding Philippines. In Philip-
pine eyes, not providing support for the Philippine claim amounts to betraying international law and 
justice itself. Addressing the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Philippine Foreign Minister lauded 
the court for having “the courage to apply the law to a country like China.”116 The Philippine case 
was presented as being:  
“of the utmost importance to the Philippines, to the region, and to the world. In our view, it is also of utmost 
significance to the integrity of the Convention, and to the very fabric of the ‘legal order for the seas and 
oceans’ that the international community so painstakingly crafted over many years. […] In the Philippines’ 
view, it is not just the Philippines’ claims against China that rest in your capable hands. Mr. President, it is 
the spirit of UNCLOS itself. […] We call on the Tribunal to kindly uphold the Convention and enable the 
rule of law to prevail.”117  
The extent of China’s perceived humiliation at the hands of the Philippines can be roughly gauged 
by the protocol of bilateral summitry. While President Aquino was welcomed to Beijing for a four-
day state visit in 2011 despite the emerging dissonances in the bilateral relationship, he was explicitly 
disinvited by the Chinese hosts only hours after he had announced his intention to attend the 2013 
China-Asean Expo in Nanning. China also all but ignored the 40th anniversary of bilateral relations 
in 2015. While Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi agreed to a working visit in the Philippines in late 
2015, his Philippine counterpart had his first and only visit to China in 2011.  
 
8.2 Malaysia: ignoring provocations and upholding the “we” 
Even though the past few years saw significantly heightened Chinese activities in Malaysian claimed 
waters, the Malaysian government evaded informing the public. While the Malaysian government 
issued diplomatic protests, these were initially kept confidential. News eventually transpired through 
Chinese and international media. As Lockman notes: “In contrast to how such exercises are greeted 
in Hanoi and Manila, the Malaysian public response has been a deafening silence.”118 
In several cases the Malaysian government seems to have been caught off guard by the public 
releases in international media.119 When for example questioned about the January 2014 oath taking 
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ceremony near James Shoal, the Malaysian Navy Chief Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Jaafar denied that it had 
happened in Malaysian claimed waters.120 He also stated that Malaysia as well as the US had been 
informed in advance of the exercises and that there “has been no act of provocation on the part of the 
Chinese or threat to our sovereignty as they are conducting their exercise in international waters.”121 
A few weeks later, the Chief of the Malaysian Defense Forces further tried to defuse the situation by 
arguing that the Chinese ships “passed through James Shoal. They did not patrol James Shoal.”122  
Malaysian Defense Minister Hishamuddin’s remarks regarding the earlier 2013 patrols signal the 
government’s overarching political framework for dealing with China. Distancing Malaysia from its 
neighbors, he stated that  
“Just because you have enemies, [this] doesn’t mean your enemies are my enemies. […] [The Chinese] can 
patrol every day, but if their intention is not to go to war […]. I think we have enough level of trust that we 
will not be moved by day-to-day politics or emotions.”123  
The Malaysian leadership continued to publicly advocate a prominent “role for quiet diplomacy – in 
the prevention of conflict, the containment of hostilities and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”124 
In an opinion piece published in both the (Chinese) People’s Daily and the (Malaysian) New Straits 
Times Malaysian Prime Minister Razak acknowledged that China has “re-emerged as a Great Power 
in a new, multipolar world order,”125 thereby simultaneously underscoring his recognition of China 
as a great power and the Chinese vision of a multipolar world order. Razak argued that “the current 
trajectory towards global multipolarity is set to continue”, and that the current hegemon should take 
note of the new major powers interest in shaping outcomes “in ways that reflect their preferences 
and interests.” He made clear Malaysia’s preferences for re-negotiating the regional order by arguing 
that such “a transition towards an evolving strategic landscape, where power and influence are more 
evenly distributed, can be managed peacefully.”126 To Razak: 
 “Malaysia and China share a similar vision. The ‘Chinese dream’ is of economic prosperity, peace and hap-
piness; a dream of opportunity not instability. Malaysia’s ‘Vision 2020’ sees us become a developed and high 
income country, and one which plays a greater role in the promotion of global peace”.127  
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Clearly, with pronouncements like these Razak echoes Chinese pretensions on the sameness of 
the “Chinese dream” and the “world dream.”  
That much of the responsibility for the current confrontation lies with the “old superpower” is most 
visibly made clear by semi-official actors as the director of the Malaysian Institute of Security and 
International Studies, who criticized the US effort “to preserve its hegemony position in this region” 
and argued that “instability can also be caused as much by a status quo power determined not to yield 
its dominant position and accommodate the rising power.” To him,  
“China has managed its role as a rising power extremely well and much better and more responsible than any 
other rising powers [sic] of the past. […] It manages its difficult situation quiet [sic] well. It has very con-
structive policy towards this region which gives utmost priority and primacy to the economic and social 
instruments and its military instruments place a very small secondary role and essentially to protect its im-
mediate environment and its vital interests.”128  
In a similar way, Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces General Zulkifeli, albeit less openly crit-
icizes the United States by arguing that “non-claimants must take caution on their actions especially 
in the disputed areas which may cause unwanted provocations and hinder the progress of the nego-
tiations.”129 He even asks whether Chinese moves in the Spratlys are not only a “rebalancing of 
pivot.”130  
Obviously Malaysian politicians consciously emphasize the role of cognitive framing, as they feel 
that “it depends on us whether we want to look at relations positively or are we going to pursue and 
navigate the waters in a negative approach” (Hishammuddin in: IISS 2014).131 As Cheng-Chwee 
Kuik quotes an anonymous Malaysian diplomat: 
“The question of whether China is in fact a threat to the region […] is a complex an debatable issue. But this 
point must not be confused with Malaysia’s conscious and deliberate policy of not viewing China as a 
threat.”132 
Notably, Malaysia and China stuck to their long-standing pattern of dense bilateral exchange. In 
2014 alone, Najib Razak paid two visits to China, meeting Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang on both ac-
counts. Chinese President Xi explicitly “acknowledged that the quiet diplomacy approach adopted 
by Malaysia was the best method, as it stressed on discussion rather than confrontation or interna-
tional liaison work involved.”133 Xi Jinping in turn visited Malaysia in 2013 and Prime Minister Li 
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Keqiang in 2015. Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Malaysia several times during the past few years. 
Besides these bilateral events, the Malaysian side is also prominently represented on various other 
venues of symbolic importance to China, as for example the Boao and the Xiangshan forum. At the 
2015 Xiangshan forum the 12 person strong Malaysian delegation was led by its Defense Minister 
and the Chief of the Defense Forces. In contrast the small Philippine delegation was led by the un-
dersecretary for Defense Policy of the Department of National Defense only.  
During the past years China also strengthened its policy of importing Malaysian liquified natural 
gas (LNG), the vast majority of which is pumped from wells in the Greater Sarawak Basin; i.e. in 
territories claimed by China as its own. While Chinese reports criticize that Malaysia “is the country 
with the lion’s share of oil resources from the Nansha Islands,”134 China has become the third largest 
customer of Malaysian LNG at the same time.135  
 
8.3 Comparing reactions 
Given that the majority of assertive Chinese actions happened in maritime regions claimed by the 
Philippines it stands to reason that the reaction of the Philippines to China should have been more 
robust than the Malaysian,. Yet, at the same time, it is important to remember that this heightened 
assertiveness ensued only after the Philippines had changed their cooperative course in the South 
China Sea in 2008 and also returned to a political rhetoric that singled China out as a strong threat-
ening Goliath.  
The Philippines exhibited an even more confrontative stance than in the wake of the Mischief reef 
occupation of 1995. They embedded the territorial conflict into an imagined comprehensive confron-
tation between the Philippines as a representative of a law-based international order and China as an 
epitome of a bullying great power that uses its might to undermine right.  
Malaysia continued to defuse the situation by highlighting bilateral trust and by focusing on the 
positive dimensions of the relationship while ignoring and later by downplaying the conflict-laden. 
Further, Malaysian officials signal “strategic empathy” to China by putting the latter’s current activ-
ities in the context of the US rebalancing towards Asia and by advocating a positive outlook on 
overall bilateral relations, which however, “is not lessons that Malaysia can teach Philippines or 
Malaysia can teach Vietnam.”136  
Yet, compared to the days of Prime Minister Mahathir, Malaysian foreign policy rhetoric has 
become decidedly less ideological and the imagined “we-group” shallower. After the waning of 
“Asian values” as an alternative to liberal democracy in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 
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and the end of the Mahathir premiership in 2003, the vision of Sino-Malaysian “sameness” has be-
come more mundane in turn.  
Mahathir’s successor Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009) still pointed to the joint vision of an East Asian 
Community that was to be “egalitarian and democratic in structure in spirit. […] Some nations must 
be given pride of place. Those accorded this pride of place must in turn know how to behave.”137 Yet 
with the Asian values gone the imagined “we-group” with China was slowly drained of much of its 
non-economic substance. Despite this de-ideologization of Malaysia’s position and the associated 
flattening of “we-ness” Malaysian politicians still signal accord with core Chinese self-role and world 
order conceptions based on the supposed similarity of the Chinese and Malaysian “dreams”.  
Despite the various government ships that plied Malaysian claimed waters in recent years, overall 
Chinese assertiveness towards Malaysia has remained at low levels compared to the Philippines. 
China’s continued non-reaction to Malaysian assertive moves has gone largely unnoticed. Put 
simply, Malaysia can still get away with activities in the disputed territories that would result in 
serious Chinese protest if not counteractions in the case of the Philippines. This is especially visible 
with respect to Malaysian offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation. Whereas China has be-
come one of the main buyers of Malaysian LNG, most of which is pumped from Chinese claimed 
territories, China actively prevents Philippine efforts to explore in the disputed Reed bank by cutting 
exploration ships cables if necessary, even though prospects are far from promising. Whereas China 
is openly threatening the Philippines with reprisal in case of exploration, the maritime activities in 
the Malaysian EEZ have never publicly been connected to the latter’s much more intense efforts at 
exploration and exploitation. Likewise, whereas China threatened international oil corporations co-
operating with the Philippines, the same corporations reap huge profits from their projects in Malay-
sian waters without encountering any Chinese criticism. Again, despite the Chinese coast guard ves-
sels in the Malaysian claimed EEZ, China is still making a huge difference when it comes to reacting 
to its opponents’ assertions. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis confirmed the two hypotheses established above. It showed that by con-
forming to and enacting a role-set that fits Chinese role-conceptions China’s opponents can positively 
influence Chinese behavior in the maritime and territorial conflicts. Higher levels of recognition and 
purported “we-group consciousness” displayed by Malaysia met with lower levels of Chinese asser-
tiveness.138 The Philippine strategy of challenging China’s self-role and world order conception cor-
responded to higher levels of Chinese assertiveness. At the same time, China displayed higher toler-
ance of Malaysian assertiveness, whereas it regularly protested and countered respective Philippine 
acts. When the Philippines temporarily changed course under the Macapagal-Arroyo administration, 
China reacted by enhancing relations and avoiding assertive acts. The Sino-Malaysian relationship 
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closely resembles the positive equilibrium between asymmetric neighbors described by Brantly 
Womack that focuses on a trade-off between deference and autonomy. It also fits the predictions of 
the model provided by Shih and his collaborators as well as the optimum behavior of a weaker power 
in the context of the traditional tributary system in Zhou Fangyin’s game theoretical model: Malaysia 
upholds recognition while maximizing immediate pay-offs; China sticks to its conciliatory strategy 
in order to uphold the overall, allegedly harmonious relationship.  
In contrast, in Womack’s language, the Philippines breach the minimum standard of deference, 
insofar as it does not pursue its interests in a manner that is respectful of China’s relative status.139 
In Shih’s and his collaborators’ terminology, the Philippines violate the requirements of reciprocity 
and thereby denies “the concealment of disharmony.”140 The Philippine challenge to the Chinese 
dictum of harmony renders it impossible to tolerate Philippine assertive acts in the disputed territo-
ries, “forcing” China to turn to “harmonious disciplining”141 in an effort to compel the Philippines to 
abide by the overall framework that is able to conceal disharmony.  
To be sure, Chinese foreign policy is no function of its opponents’ strategies; yet, this research 
has shown that it can be influenced by them to the better or worse. Whether the detected logic of a 
positive trade-off between a weaker party’s recognition of a stronger parties’ self role and world 
order conception in exchange for the latter’s heightened readiness to compromise with respect to 
immediate interests and gains can also be applied to other cases is an important question for further 
research.  
The Malaysian strategy of toning down the dispute by withholding information contrasts sharply 
with the Philippine governments’ strategy of giving uttermost publicity to acts of Chinese assertive-
ness. Likewise the restraint shown by the Malaysia media is inconceivable in the Philippines, where 
the conflict is widely reported and commented on. It stands to reason that regime type may play a 
certain role in determining the options open to government, with non- or semi-democratic regimes 
having a higher ability to spin-doctor information.142 Yet, glance at the Vietnamese public relations 
strategy of the past years illustrates that the structural advantage enjoyed by authoritarian regimes, 
need not translate in a uniform Malaysian-style strategy focused on minimizing a nationalistic out-
cry.143 This holds also true with respect to China’s relations with Japan, where the Chinese govern-
ment seems to have utilized popular nationalism for external signaling.144 While the capacity of au-
thoritarian regimes to control the dissemination as well as the framing of information is superior to 
those of democratic regimes, this should not be equaled with a uniform will to act accordingly.145 
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Likewise, democratic governments by filtering information and providing ready-made frames for the 
media may spin-doctor the ensuing reporting so that it fits their political needs.146 At this point a final 
caveat seems in order. Given the opaqueness of the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process, 
this analysis could not prove that the specific levels of Chinese assertiveness have really been caused 
by differences in the opponents’ recognition of core aspects of China’s overall self-role and world-
order conceptions. However, in contrast to alternative explanations it could provide a plausible ar-
gument not only for the between-dyad variation, but also for the within-dyad over-time-stability and 
variation.  
Competing explanations include the popular salami-slicing “theory” according to which China 
for the past decades followed a conscious strategy of “using small incremental actions, none of which 
by itself is a casus belli,”147 which, however, taken together result in a major strategic change. While 
this fairly popular explanation of Chinese assertiveness provides a rationale for the observable alter-
nation between escalation and “cooling-off” periods, it would suggest a fairly coherent strategy to-
wards all opponents and is unable to explain the consistent downgrading of the territorial and mari-
time conflict with Malaysia. 
Another explanation links China’s rising assertiveness to the leadership change from Hu Jintao 
to Xi Jinping148 and the corresponding downgrading of Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that the South China 
Sea claimants should shelve the sovereignty issue and pursue joint development for the time being. 
While China clearly acted more self-confidently in the South China Sea (and beyond) during the past 
years, linking this shift to the leadership change from Hu to Xi seems to be an oversimplification of 
complex and overlapping dynamics, as early analyses of China’s “new assertiveness” already sur-
faced several years before Xi’s election,149 and the Chinese leadership change closely trails the US 
pivot to Asia, which could equally qualify as a trigger for Chinese repositioning. More importantly, 
leadership change provides no explanation for the continuity of unequal  dealing with Malaysia and 
the Philippines. The above analysis has show that while Sino-Malaysian relations have not been left 
undamaged by the escalations in Sino-Philippine, Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Japanese relations, the 
behavioral differences continue to exist, despite some acts of Chinese assertiveness towards Malay-
sia.  
Several other strands of explanation connect China’s present assertiveness to its increased eco-
nomic and military capabilities. Explanations focusing on the rise in China’s capabilities clearly sug-
gest a more or less linear rise of Chinese assertiveness and therefore are hard pressed to explain 
earlier phases of Chinese assertiveness. Compared to the past willingness to engage in shooting wars 
with its neighbors, China showed more restraint even in its initial effort at establishing a foothold on 
 
146 See for example: Emily D. Shaw, The Heroic Framing of US Foreign Policy, PhD dissertation, University of Berkeley, 
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147 Bonnie Glaser, ‘Opening Statement before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred Four-
teenth Congress, First Session,’ Washington, May 13, 2015,: p. 7,  http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/tran-
scripts/May%2013,%202015%20Hearing%20Transcript.pdf.  
148 Irene Chan and Mingjiang Li, ‘New Chinese Leadership, New Policy in the South China Sea Dispute?,’ Journal of 
Chinese Political Science, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2015, pp. 35-50. For an analysis embedding Xi’s role in the institutional 
context of Chinese foreign policy-making see Kerry Brown, ‘Foreign Policy Making Under Xi Jinping: The Case of 
the South China Sea,’ The Journal of Political Risk, February 10, 2016, http://www.jpolrisk.com/foreign-policy-mak-
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149 For a critical appraisal of the literature on the new Chinese assertiveness see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and 
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35 
 
the Spratlys in 1988,150 and has then as later targeted elevations that did not require the ejection of 
any other claimant’s occupying forces, even though this meant foregoing effective control of natural 
islands and thereby reducing the legal quality of the PRC’s claims. Similar to the other alternative 
explanations discussed above “the rise of China” cannot explain variation in the behavior towards 
different opponents.  
Alternatively, it can be argued that China resorted to a “divide and rule” policy aimed at under-
mining the opponents’ solidarizing with each other and establishing a united front against China.151 
In general the argument may be supported by China’s preference for bilateral negotiations and its 
consistent resistance against the involvement of ASEAN, non-claimant powers or international arbi-
tration in conflict resolution. Yet, in order to be valid, this argument has to discount the rationale 
provided consistently by Chinese elites for their preference on “bilateralism” with respect to problem 
solving in territorial disputes. To China, bilateral negotiation is an apt strategy, as it enabled China 
in the past to achieve mutually satisfactory solutions to almost all other territorial disputes in the past 
decades. Insofar, the Chinese argument for restricting conflict resolution efforts to the concerned 
parties gains some credibility as a shared belief of Chinese elites gained from prior experience. Fur-
ther, by not reacting to Malaysian assertive acts in the past, China not only allowed Malaysia to 
extract a large amount of oil and gas from disputed territories, but may have simultaneously weak-
ened its legal claim to the disputed territories. The legal and political costs” to a “divide and rule” 
policy then are clearly not insignificant. Finally, a divide and rule explanation cannot explain, why 
China decides for “preferential” treatment of certain opponents compared to the other opponents. In 
order to explain Chinese choice an additional line of reasoning is necessary.A final argument against 
the validity of the analysis advanced above may be derived from the simple observation that distance 
matters. Given China’s meager but growing power projection capabilities, China could simply have 
focused its assertion on the “easiest” targets and saved Malaysia for later. The current Chinese moves 
in Malaysian claimed waters could be read as a possible first step in this direction. While distance 
certainly mattered in the 1970s, in the late 1980s already China could have occupied one or several 
of the Malaysian claimed islands to the South or East of Cuarteron reef. Similarly, the 1995 decision 
to occupy Mischief reef is not self-evident. Again, Erica Reef or Investigator shoal, occupied by 
Malaysia in 1999 only would have provided viable alternatives. A further argument against the dic-
tum of distance is provided by taking a look at China’s maritime dispute with Korea, which focuses 
on the limits of the two countries’ overlapping EEZs and Socotra rock. Socotra rock is only approx-
imately 250 kilometers off the nearest Chinese island and claimed by China as part of its EEZ, yet, 
China did not go beyond diplomatic protest when South Korea built an artificial installation on the 
rock that even included a helicopter landing pad in the early to mid 2000s. While Chinese patrols 
increased in the following years, both countries managed this conflict without much fanfare. Despite 
its misgivings about the Korean action and the short distance, China up to the present did not resort 
to more forceful assertions of its claims. When Korea made its submission to the Commission on the 
 
150 The armed clashes did not occur on an elevation already occupied by Vietnamese troops, but evolved, when the two 
parties tried to secure a further up to then unoccupied reef. Clearly, China had initially tried to avoid a direct confron-
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Continental Shelf in 2012, China did not protest, even though the Chinese and the Korean submis-
sions overlapped. To the contrary, Chinese officials lauded Korea for consulting China during the 
preparation of the submission and stressed the two countries’ “cooperative positions on the issue of 
the East China Sea shelf.”152 It is probably more than a mere coincidence that the past and present 
South Korean administrations in general accorded high priority to good overall relations with China, 
avoided any reference to its alliance relationship with the United States in handling the maritime 
conflict, and, with the exception of the lee Myung-bak administration, tried to push various initiatives 
for enhanced and inclusive security cooperation during the past decades. Sino-Korean relations could 
be a further test-case for further substantiating the observation drawn from the comparison of Sino-
Malaysian and Sino-Philippine relations that China may be willing to compromise its territorial in-
terests when the significant other reacts positively to the Chinese normative framework for desirable 
international relations. 
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